Before We Fix "Cash," We Must Answer One Question: Why Are We Still Here?

Executive Summary

The Problem: In my last post, I exposed the brutal triage of the "hyperprioritized" humanitarian system—a system now targeting just 31 million of the 180.5 million people in need. The inefficiency forcing these cuts is not just operational; it's strategic. It stems from our failure to ask the most basic question: Why are we, as humanitarian actors, providing basic needs support in the first place?
The Diagnostic Failure: The answer dictates our entire strategy. Yet we treat all crises as if they were the same, applying a single, broken model to fundamentally different problems—from a government overwhelmed by a natural disaster to a state actively creating a conflict. My career has given me a unique view of this failure, having designed emergency cash in conflict zones and advised governments on their national social protection systems.
The Consequence: This lack of diagnostic clarity is the root of our "cash confusion." We argue about MEBs and modalities because we haven't agreed on our core purpose in a given context. Are we a temporary surge force, a long-term welfare provider, or a principled, independent lifeline?
The Solution: I propose a diagnostic framework based on the four realities we face. Only by first identifying the nature of the crisis can we deploy the right tools, define our exit strategy, and stop the mission creep that wastes millions. This isn't an academic exercise. Getting the "why" right is the most powerful efficiency gain available. It's how we stop funding our own confusion and start funding the programs we are currently forced to sacrifice.

1. Introduction: The Diagnosis We Refuse to Make

Last week, I detailed the brutal mathematics of our hyperprioritized reality. This isn't a theoretical problem. The 2025 Global Humanitarian Overview is clear: of the 180.5 million people identified as being in acute need, the UN and its partners will target a mere 31 million. That's a gap of nearly 150 million people. The response from many colleagues was a weary nod of recognition, followed by a critical question: How did we become so inefficient that such choices are necessary?

While shrinking budgets are the immediate cause, the root of our waste lies in a profound, strategic failure, compounded by a hollowing out of the very expertise needed to navigate it. As we see mass reductions-in-force at major donor agencies, we are losing the institutional memory that prevents repeating past mistakes. For decades, we have deployed a single, monolithic model of "humanitarian assistance" to solve wildly different problems. We have stopped making the most crucial assessment of all: a clear diagnosis of why our presence is required.

Having spent my career on both sides of this line—designing rapid cash responses for NGOs in conflict zones and advising governments on their national social protection architecture—I have seen this diagnostic failure play out in real-time. It is the original sin from which all our operational chaos flows. Is the state a willing but overwhelmed partner? Is it a neglectful actor in a cycle of chronic crisis? Or is it a party to the conflict, making partnership a violation of our principles? The answer to this foundational question should determine everything that follows. Instead, we ignore it, and in doing so, we create the operational chaos and programmatic confusion that costs us millions and, ultimately, costs lives.

2. The Four Realities: A Diagnostic Framework for Humanitarian Presence

Before we can design a single program or calculate a single transfer value, we must diagnose the context. Our presence can be categorized into one of four fundamentally different realities.

Reality 1: The Overwhelmed State (The Natural Disaster Model)

The Scenario: A sudden-onset disaster (earthquake, mega-flood) strikes a country with a functioning, legitimate government. Their capacity is simply overwhelmed, and they formally request international assistance. This is the most straightforward context for humanitarian action.
Our Mandate: To act as a temporary surge capacity. Our role is to fill a specific, short-term gap while the state mobilizes its own resources. We bring international expertise, resources, and speed that can supplement, but not replace, the national response.
The Inherent Risk: The "humanitarian hangover." This is a risk I saw materialize during the European refugee response. We, the international community, built sophisticated systems that were effective in the short term but created a parallel structure that was difficult to dismantle. We stay too long, build systems that are not integrated with national ones, and create dependencies that can inadvertently undermine the very state we came to support.
The Implication: Our purpose here is explicitly temporary. The exit strategy must be planned from day one. Every decision, from the technology we use to the partnerships we form, must be made with the question, "How does this support the national system to take over?"

Reality 2: The Recurrent Crisis (The Dependency Trap Model)

The Scenario: A predictable, seasonal crisis (drought, annual flooding) in a region with weak governance and chronic poverty. We arrive to respond to the "emergency" of the drought but find ourselves confronting decades of under-development.
Our Mandate: This is where our confusion begins. Our mandate is to address the shock, but the needs we find are chronic. My work in East Africa has shown me this pattern repeatedly. We arrive with emergency tools, but the problem isn't just the failed rains; it's the failed state and collapsed markets. As African leaders themselves are now saying, the goal must be to move beyond the "aid trap" and forge "dignified partnerships."
The Inherent Risk: Mission Creep. Our emergency tools are used to treat a chronic illness. We become a permanent, parallel welfare system, creating a cycle of dependency that donors are increasingly unwilling to fund. Our short-term cash injections become the local economy, and our presence becomes a structural feature of the landscape.
The Implication: This is the context that most brutally exposes our internal confusion. We must have the discipline to distinguish the shock from the chronic condition. If we cannot, we are not humanitarians; we are simply poorly funded, unaccountable welfare providers, ignoring the calls from our partners for a more sustainable relationship.

Reality 3: The State as an Actor (The Conflict Model)

The Scenario: An internal or international conflict where the "government" is one of the warring parties.
Our Mandate: To provide principled, independent, and neutral assistance to all civilians, regardless of who controls the territory.
The Inherent Risk: Co-option and Compromise. Working with or through a state that is a party to the conflict risks violating our neutrality, jeopardizing our access, and making our staff targets. My experience in Yemen, advising the Humanitarian Coordinator, was a constant lesson in navigating this risk. Every interaction with authorities, every request for data, had to be weighed against the potential perception of taking a side.
The Implication: Here, our independence is our most valuable asset. Any "system-strengthening" is a red line. Our presence is defined by our ability to remain separate from state structures. To do otherwise is to abandon our core principles and become an instrument of the conflict itself.

Reality 4: The "Messy Middle" (The Complex Crisis Model)

The Scenario: A mix of all the above. A country with a weak central government (a recurrent crisis), an active internal conflict in one region (state as actor), and a recent natural disaster in another (overwhelmed state). This is the reality in many of our largest operations.
Our Mandate: To be surgically precise in our diagnosis, region by region. We cannot apply a single national strategy.
The Inherent Risk: Strategic Laziness. Applying a one-size-fits-all approach that is inappropriate for most of the context, leading to massive inefficiency and risk.
The Implication: This requires the most sophisticated analysis. My work in Ukraine showed this clearly. I was on a call last week discussing cash programming in government-controlled Kyiv, where we could advise the Ministry of Social Policy on their national systems, and an hour later on a different call about delivering aid under fire near the frontlines. To pretend a single strategy could work for both is malpractice. We must be able to say: "In Region A, we partner with the provincial government. In Region B, we operate independently. In Region C, we are addressing chronic needs and must have a clear handover plan to development actors."

3. How a Clear Diagnosis Solves Our "Cash Confusion"

Let's be honest. Our internal arguments over cash are merely symptoms of this deeper, diagnostic failure. The debates I hear every day—about whether to use government social protection systems, whether our transfers create inflation, or how to calculate a "dignified" MEB—are proxies for this core confusion. We are using the wrong tool for the job because we haven't correctly identified the job.

The framework of Emergency Lifeline vs. Systemic Support only works after we've made our diagnosis:

In an Overwhelmed State or Conflict scenario, our diagnosis tells us our role is the Emergency Lifeline. Our cash is for short-term survival. We don't need a perfect, development-grade MEB; we need a "good enough" transfer value delivered today. The endless debates about the precise composition of a survival basket are a wasteful distraction when the house is on fire.
In a Recurrent Crisis, our diagnosis forces us to be brutally honest. Our humanitarian funds are for the Emergency Lifeline to address the shock. The chronic poverty requires Systemic Support, which is a development task. If we are forced to use emergency funds for this, we must acknowledge we are plugging a gap, not solving the problem. This prevents us from deluding ourselves that our 6-month cash program is a long-term solution.
In the Messy Middle, our diagnosis demands disaggregation. A cash program in a government-held area might be designed to link to social protection, while a program in a non-state area must be a standalone, independent lifeline.

By diagnosing the "why," we bring clarity to the "how." We stop trying to make one tool do every job and can finally have an honest conversation about using the right tool for the right purpose.

4. Conclusion: The Moral Imperative of a Correct Diagnosis

The hyperprioritized system has stripped us of our margin for error. We can no longer afford the intellectual laziness of a one-size-fits-all approach. The waste is staggering. We see major donors planning to cut over a billion from existing grants, and UN job postings are down over 40% - the system is contracting violently. The millions we waste by deploying the wrong strategy in the wrong context is money taken directly from the education, protection, and futures of the people we serve.

The path to a more efficient and effective humanitarian system does not start in a high-level panel. It starts with what leaders like Jan Egeland and Joyce Msuya have called for: a "radical simplification" and a fundamental commitment, in every country office, to first ask, and honestly answer, the question: Why are we here?

Only when we have the courage to make that diagnosis can we prescribe the right treatment. For donors, this means creating distinct funding streams that match these different realities. For humanitarians, it means having the discipline to define our mandate and, crucially, to know when our job is done.

Having stood on the bridge between these two worlds, I know that this clarity is not a bureaucratic exercise. In an age of triage, it is a moral imperative. It is the only way we can look ourselves in the mirror and say we did everything possible, not just to respond to the crisis, but to respond correctly.

Get Involved

This diagnosis is the start of a conversation, not the end. I want to hear from you.

For practitioners in the field: Which of these four realities best describes your current context, and how does it clash with your organization's stated strategy?
For donors and policymakers: How can we create funding streams that are flexible enough to distinguish between a surge need (Reality 1) and a chronic dependency (Reality 2)?
For everyone: What's the single biggest obstacle—political, bureaucratic, or otherwise—to making an honest 'diagnosis' in your context?

Share your thoughts in the comments below. What are you seeing on the ground?

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